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AbstrAct: as concepts, communication and information are very closely related, but they also 
designate more than their usual conceptual meaning when they are called upon in social theories 
as well as in philosophical theories about the reality and the truth of  social life; information and 
communication are then designating physical events or event like objects of  the observable reality, 
which will be hereafter described as a procedural ontologization of  information. why do they 
have this role and how do they play it in contemporary social sciences and philosophy of  social 
sciences? this article questions the scientificity of  these concepts in these theoretical contexts. it 
wants to propose a framework for an epistemology of  communication and information that is 
critical about the cybernetician paradigm in the social sciences. it presents this paradigm’s main 
features: informational ontology and probabilistic sociality. it offers a critique of  this paradigm’s 
epistemological and methodological pretensions. it finally exposes the basis of  an alternative 
philosophical theory of  communication that wants to support the thesis that the cybernetician 
paradigmatic communication theory is not scientifically productive; and that it cannot be used 
in social scientific theoretical contexts without being dramatically redesigned and reoriented 
towards new goals. 
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intRoduction
is “communication” a sufficiently well defined concept that it can undoubtedly be 
an object of  philosophical investigation? to be sure, the word has been in usage for 
quite a while now, but not so much in philosophy where it has been used mostly to des-
. over the last thirty years, more or less, there were indeed efforts made to give of  this concept some philo-
sophical grounding; ethics and social philosophy first offered the needed locus for philosophical discussions 
about, essentially, the effects of  communication on society, when e.g. considering the medias’ actions of  
distributing “information” amongst groups and individuals. let us remind that this was already in Kant’s 
interrogations on the foundations of  republican democracy. But communication and information theories 
and concepts have just begun, over the past decade or so, to be regarded as philosophical objects per se. 
this paper is a contribution to these efforts. (By saying this, i am not saying that, e.g., dreyfus’s, dretske’s, 
crosson’s or sayre’s earlier works are strangers to this type of  philosophical work, on the contrary, but they 
represent exceptions, a small number of  pioneer works. cRosson, frederick J., sayRe, Kenneth m. 
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ignate a commonly accepted known fact of  social life, following which human beings 
communicate amongst themselves, like other primates as well as other mammals for that 
matter, but they do so with more precise devices such as human languages and tech-
nologies of  different sorts—which characterize Homo communicans. this way of  seeing 
communicational observable facts in human societies has a lot to do with a well known 
anthropological posture inherited from social scientists of  the mid 950s of  which many 
were active members of  what since has been called the “cybernetics Group”.2 this 
posture has gradually been shaped as a Kuhnian paradigm by social scientists as well as 
by philosophers. hence, it is never surprising to read that communication theory can 
serve as a set of  postulates in cultural surveys, nor is it less unusual to hear about many 
social action types in terms of  the information they supposedly embrace. as concepts, 
communication and information are very closely related, but they also designate more 
than their usual conceptual meaning when they are called upon in social theories as well 
as in philosophical theories about the reality and the truth of  social life; information 
and communication are then designating physical events or event like objects of  the observ-
able reality.
why are these concepts playing such a role? why is it that criticizing their paradig-
matic usages and the epistemological trends to which they belong, always or almost all 
the time sounds odd? what makes this cybernetician paradigm so strong?
this article is about possible answers to these questions. it is aimed at proposing 
a framework for an epistemology of  communication and information that is critical 
about the cybernetician paradigm in the social sciences. i will first present this para-
digm’s main features. secondly, i will criticize its epistemological and methodological 
pretensions. thirdly, i will conclude by exposing the basis of  an alternative philosophi-
cal theory of  communication that will, i hope, correctly support my thesis that that para-
digmatic communication theory is not scientifically productive; nor is it true that it can 
be used in social scientific theoretical contexts without being dramatically redesigned 
and reoriented towards new goals.
. the cyBeRnetician PaRadiGm
when the concept of  cybernetics was proposed by n. weiner in the late 940s, its 
meaning was not obvious at all—so it was with wiener’s peculiar philosophy (he insisted 
it was a fully-fledged science but of  a new type, however) in which it appeared. it signi-
fied that informational-mathematical modelling could from thereon cover the entire 
spectra of  physical, biological, social and psychological phenomena. its scope was so 
(eds) (967), Philosophy and Cybernetics, notre-dame: university of  notre-dame Press; sayRe, Kenneth m., 
Cybernetics and the Philosophy of  Mind, london: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 976; dRetsKe, f. (98), 
Knowledge and the Flow of  Information, cambridge, (mass.): m.i.t. Press.)
2. heims, s. (99), The Cybernetics Group, cambridge (mass.): mit Press; seGal, J. (2003), Le Zéro et 
le Un. Histoire de la notion scientifique d’information au 20e siècle, Paris: Éditions syllepse, coll. matériologiques; 
lafontaine, céline (2004), L’empire de la cybernétique. Des machines à penser à la pensée machine, Paris: Éditions 
du seuil.
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broad, that it allowed wiener to be optimistic about the unification of  all sciences under 
a simpler one;3 a science, furthermore, that was meant to offer a real potential for prac-
tical applications of  all kinds, i.e. for the development of  truly efficient technologies, 
which goal would be the controlling of  processes of  any kind—whether physical, bio-
logical, social or psychological. if  it was cybernetics’ first postulate, an epistemological 
claim, that everything could be modeled as an informational process; its second postu-
late, a more methodologically oriented  one, was that informational processes could be 
controlled, which meant precisely that men could intervene on them and modify them 
at will purposively. to achieve this, of  course it would have been necessary to obtain a 
complete understanding of  how these processes function as informational ones; not to 
mention understanding what sciences would be like once translated into the new lan-
guage of  informational theory. these became the heart of  a vast research programme 
that is not quite achieved yet.4 
But if  nowadays it is commonly accepted to speak lavishly of  objects of  scientific 
inquiries in terms of  communication and of  information, one has to ask oneself, not 
only why this is now the case; but how this transformation process from the inside of  
social sciences became possible and feasible. in brief, one has to ask: what did these 
concepts and theories do to social sciences?
first, scientists and philosophers had to accept to work towards a common goal; 
unification of  sciences was part of  this programme, but not solely. the goal in question 
is tantamount to the naturalization of  social sciences, which means in practice that sci-
entific methods would need to be standardized and operationally determined to procure 
relatively “safe” explanations and perhaps theories about social facts. the concepts of  
social facts had then to be believed to mean “observable facts”, where the observabil-
ity of  these facts was defined in opposition to some sort of  Kantian dichotomy as to 
whether facts are phenomenologically determined or lie behind physical appearances. 
whence it follows that a form of  physicalism was necessary. it implied that social facts 
were observable manifestations of  interactions forming the social structure, but not all 
of  them could be directly observed, if  only because of  the size of  some of  the social 
facts and because of  their experimental irreproducibility. a hierarchy of  what counted 
as observable social facts had to be established in order to escape from the classical traps 
of  holism and methodological individualism. with this dynamic physicalist represen-
tation of  social factuality, it was therefore possible to distinguish in between different 
3. on the general problem of  unification of  sciences, see: Galison, Peter, stumP, david J., (996) The 
Disunity of  Science. Boundaries, Contexts and Power, stanford: stanford university Press. But what is less known 
is that in fact wiener did not believe that physics should serve as the reference science to which any other 
should be reduced. information theory was called to play this role.
4. see e.g.: BeniGeR, James R. (986), The Control Revolution. Technological and Economic Origins of  the 
Information Society, cambridge (mass.): harvard university Press; von BaeyeR, hans christian (2004), 
Information: The New Language of  Science, cambridge (mass.): harvard university Press. theoretical and 
sociological backgrounds are discussed in segal (2003), lafontaine (2004), heims (99). see also: sayRe, 
Kenneth m., “cybernetics” in shanKeR, stuart, ed. (996), Philosophy of  Science, Logic and Mathematics in 
the Twentieth Century, london: Routledge., coll. history of  Philosophy, vol. 9, p. 292-34.
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classes of  social actions that mobilized lesser justifications, only because, as it were, the 
inobservability of  some class members wasn’t a real problem anymore: it was a matter 
for better model and techniques. for example, macro-social facts could be derived from 
aggregation techniques of  some kind5, whether statistical or not.
as is well known, physicalism (which is somewhat different from physicism) is a 
doctrine mostly referred to as typical of  vienna circle’s theory of  scientific language 
(carnap’s, to be more precise) as reducible to physic’s protocol formulas about observ-
able physical facts. these methodological postulates reproduce the relations that 
observational and analytical languages were said to have in natural sciences. But what 
happened with social sciences was not only about their language, its theory or its practi-
cal normative rule set. it was also and probably in majority about the identification of  
the fundamental nature of  social facts. the observational-analytical relation inspired 
from physical sciences (and/or its philosophy at least) and established inside the social 
sciences was therefore a methodological stance that allowed social scientists to import 
model theories and concepts from natural sciences. with or even because of  them, 
social systems became real,6 observable and analysable as any other complex systems, 
whether natural or cultural. and as real systems, they were decomposable into sub-units 
or sub-systems of  social reality. the social scientists’ work became from this moment 
on, a task consisting of  finding these units and analysing them as composed of  variables 
of  systemic equations—even though it is true that not all social scientists master differ-
ential calculus or statistics techniques, but such equations did not and still don’t receive 
always a mathematical treatment.
this may seem a bit farfetched, but i suggest that this impression can be easily dis-
sipated if  one considers that these formalization techniques are equally quantification 
ones. for there is no point at all to model social or economic facts with these logical 
or mathematical apparatus if  one doesn’t have the implicit ambition of  quantifying 
observed social facts and treat them as participants in the bigger picture, which is the 
theorization of  society as a communicative system in which methodologically identified 
social units carry bits of  information about the system itself. the numerous surveys, 
whether social, political or economic, are first hand examples of  this paradigmatic atti-
tude towards quantification of  social facts: they all result in a representation of  society 
as a matrix of  interactions in which numbers give immediate information about the 
social composition of  analyzed facts.
i am suggesting that the cybernetician paradigm profoundly transformed the core 
of  the philosophy of  social sciences as well as of  these sciences themselves. did it trans-
5. see e.g.: simon, herbert (997), Models of  Bounded Rationality, Empirically Grounded Economic Reason, Volume 
3, cambridge: m.i.t. Press.
6. except maybe for niklas luhmann who proposed a social system theory where social systems were not 
observable as such but only derivable from communication process inferred as the result of  meaning trans-
fer within self-referential social systems. see: luhmann, niklas (995), Social Systems, stanford: stanford 
university Press, and “ the autopoiesis of  social systems ” (986) in GeyeR, felix, van der Zouwen, 
Johannes (eds), Sociocybernetics Paradoxes. Observation, Control and Evolution of  Self-Steering Systems, new delhi: 
sage Publications, pp. 72-92.
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form all of  them? or, more precisely, did it influence even the social scientists and 
philosophers who were or still are not much excited by quantitative methodologies? i 
think so. for, what i think is most important here, is not the fact that some social sci-
entists adopted or not mathematic or formalization techniques, but the fact that the 
cybernetician paradigm offered what i. hacking calls “style of  reasoning”.7 it became 
therefore possible for these researchers to think of  society as something like a force field 
in which interactions were organized as to form systems, and where these systems could 
be described empirically and formally, and their results and consequences or systemic 
productions could be explained in objectively founded terms—all of  which are evi-
dently methodological prescriptions that have the peculiar effect of  imposing spectacles 
for better seeing what social science ought to do and be. whether or not social scientists 
used information theory’s formal and conceptual devices, is relevant only to the point 
where these same scientists believed that what sociality was all about was only the basic 
fact that it was informational and communicational in nature.
the cybernetician paradigm thus gave, secondly, to social sciences the faith in their 
own legitimacy as sciences, in every way comparable to any other. the history of  the 
introduction of  early social scientists in the cybernetics Group is quite instructive on 
how they were called to justify their works as these were compared an discussed on 
the same level and submitted to  the same analytical categories that information theo-
ries’ ones. But that is not the whole story, which is not only about justification. it is 
also the story of  social recognition, amongst scientists, of  the possibility of  connecting 
together natural and social sciences, within a common conceptual framework and by 
using a common technical vocabulary. if  for instance physics was to incorporate and 
work inside informational schemes of  reasoning, the only way to have the social sci-
ences “communicate” with them was most surely to give the latter the opportunity to 
apply the same schemes to complex and non-directly observable systems, namely social 
systems. social sciences became therefore also sciences whose objects were not all and 
always explainable within a classical empirical framework. they could draw of  society 
a more abstract picture indeed.
2. cyBeRnetician PaRadiGm’s methodoloGical and 
ePistemoloGical claims
my thesis is that these imports from natural sciences to social sciences, under the 
protective umbrella of  cybernetics’ informational schemes of  reasoning, if  they were 
intended to give to the latter the opportunity to specify its language and techniques, 
only resulted in a more blurred and unspecified conceptual schemes, for the new social 
concepts and theories were useful only in metaphoric or rhetoric ways of  speech. there 
is nothing intrinsically wrong with the use of  metaphors or analogy, if  we consider 
7. hacKinG, ian, “the disunities of  the sciences”, in Galison, Peter, stumP, david J. (996), op. cit., 
p. 37-74. also: hacKinG, ian (983), Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of  Natural 
Sciences, cambridge: cambridge university Press.
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them to be, as durkheim proposed it,8 a legitimate form of  comparison, not a proof  
technique whatsoever. But one has to be clear about the goals he or she is pursuing 
when using categories that are bound to fail any test about their epistemic productivity 
or reliability.
however, leaving aside the analogy problem for further reflections, this second part 
of  the article will be studying only two of  the cybernetician paradigm’s major compo-
nents. the first one, i identify it as the ontologization of  information; the second one 
has to do with the probabilistic scheme with which social facts are analysed. these 
characteristics cannot be understood rightly without noticing that they are incipient 
to a meta-theoretical framework that states that some special causal relations are to be 
identified and handle with if  one wants to supply with a truly scientific explanation of  
the social system’s behaviour.
Informational ontology
 in the present context, the phrase “informational ontology” is not intended to 
refer to the concept of  “formal ontology” as used in cognitive sciences, as the latter 
identifies a categorization technique whose purpose is to represent a set of  knowledge 
propositional contents in a structure compatible or associated with knowledge-based 
system technologies.9 the former refers to the fact that within much of  the social sci-
ences, the concept of  information is often subjected to a dramatic meaning shift, from 
epistemic to ontological, rendering it, as a consequence, fuzzy and giving of  social facts 
an oversimplified view.
in order to analyse the shift in question, we have to settle the meaning of  the notions 
we are working with. first, whatever mathematical or so-called scientific concept of  
information we have in hand, it is not generally the case that social scientists or philoso-
phers interested in the philosophy of  social sciences will make use of  it in the way it is 
supposed to be used, i.e. as a formal model. their very design, in mathematical forms, is 
not what is in stake here; it is the interpretation often given to a mathematical model in 
social sciences that is.0 anyhow, let this model be shannon’s, for this particular theory 
8. duRKheim, Émile (996), Sociologie et philosophie, Paris: Presses universitaires de france, collection 
Quadrige.
9. for a critique of  the concept of  formal ontology theory, see: RoBillaRd, Jean (2004), « ontologies: 
antinomies, contradictions et autres difficultés épistémologiques du concept », Revue STICEF, volume , 
issn: 764-7223, put on line on 5/0/2004, http://www.sticef.org. also see: smith, Barry (2004), 
« ontology », in floRidi, luciano (ed.), Philosophy of  Computing and Information, oxford (uK): Blackwell 
Publishing, p. 55-66.
0. as mario Bunge puts it: “in order for a mathematical formula to represent a fact, it must be conjoined 
with one or more semantic assumption—that is, statements identifying the intended referents and the 
properties of  the referents that the predicates are suppose to represent.” BunGe, mario (996), Finding 
Philosophy in Social Science, new haven and london: yale university Press, p. 64. the problem with math-
ematical formalization in the social sciences is, as a whole, the imprecise characteristics of  the reference 
class members. what do mathematical formulas represent? 
. shannon, claude, weaveR, warren (963; 949), The Mathematical Theory of  Communication, 
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is the one an immense majority of  thinkers generally refer to, whether explicitly or not. 
how does this model work in social sciences? a blunt answer is: not very well. then 
again, this answer has to be explained, knowing from the start that shannon worked 
after concepts like one of  entropy, which is of  course a thermodynamic concept. the 
very definition of  entropy is used by shannon as a representation of  the measure of  the 
maximal uncertainty of  a message. it is not surprising that shannon reproduces liter-
ally Boltzmann’s formula as also applicable to the measure of  information in a message: 
 
where the constant k determines in shannon’s theory the selection of  information units, 
or bits.
now, what this formula says has nothing to do a priori with any social facts, events or 
whatever. for shannon himself, it had no meaning whatsoever, stating that the “seman-
tic aspects of  communication are irrelevant to engineering problem.” (shannon, 96; 
p.32).2 it only has to do with what is supposed to happen ideally in a communication 
channel—in wires and lamps of  all sorts, and what had you not in the late forties as 
communication technology or whatever technology is available today. this formula 
is solely aimed at quantifying a physical process of  signal transfer from a source to a 
receptor through coding and channelling (assuming, as it is correct to do, that signals 
are conveyed under the form of  electrical energy). still, it says nothing about the proc-
ess in itself  because the signals cannot be observed as such; their behaviour is inferred 
because it is possible to measure the differential quantum or state after the process has 
been performing its tasks.
was the theory proved efficient in the engineering field? of  course it did—with 
the help of  other technical devices such as programming languages, programs and 
computers and so on and so forth, which all contributed to render a somewhat radical 
empirical demonstration of  its possibilities and worth. what about its efficiency in the 
social sciences? in order to have any, the concepts of  information and the notion of  
its measurement in social activities had to be incorporated into the latter; moreover, it 
had to be accounted for, that any social fact, activity or event could not be measured 
without considering that they were appraisable within a probabilistic or even stochastic 
systemic matrix; of  which i will soon say more. to achieve this, social sciences had, in 
fine, to integrate a philosophical view which would support all of  these methodologi-
cal and epistemological claims. such a view states that social facts, activities or events 
are what they are because of  an encoding process that exists independently of  the 
actors themselves, of  their will or their awareness of  being in different ways submitted 
urbana and chicago: university of  illinois Press. segal (op. cit.) has shown how these theories were intro-
duced in many scientific domains. for a study of  the information theory’s impacts in social sciences, see: 
lafontaine, céline (2004), L’empire de la cybernétique. Des machines à penser à la pensée machine, Paris: seuil.
2. K.m. sayre confirms this in his “cybernetics” article in shanker, 996, op. cit., p.298.
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to this very same process—promoting a non phenomenological thesis, closely related 
to a positivist approach, about social interactions of  any kind. observation was there-
fore a searcher’s activity that relied not on observing social facts, activities or events in 
themselves, but one aimed at identifying what they meant from this philosophical point 
of  view, i.e. in discovering their structural relations and their significance as instances of  
a social code, whether symbolically manifesting itself  through exchanging beliefs about 
what holds symbols together in the social net they contribute to weave—which gives 
them their social relevance and their sociological meaning—, or by reproducing struc-
tural properties of  a system so constructed. this has to do with a durkheimian type of  
holism—this should not be a surprise to anyone—which modern social scientists would 
probably prefer calling an emergentist theory of  the social (which gives a darwinian 
colour to the theory). But does this amount to a complete theory of  society as being 
informational? the answer is: no, not even close. why? it does not simply because the 
concept of  information hardly refers to anything that can surely be measured at all. 
what in effect is observed and measured: Behaviours? discourses? speech acts? Belief  
contents? communicational contents? actions? events? and what are all these con-
cepts supposed to correspond to in real social life? what exactly the constant k should 
refer to as meaning a selection procedure? how can we attribute a probability value to 
any of  these “facts” once we agree on how to describe them and on how to categorize 
their empirical properties and the functions and relations they entertain in what could 
only then be called a social system, i.e. a set of  functional relations between some or all 
of  its elements’ properties? 
we can see that observation has not much to do here with an empiricist theory 
that would reproduce humean perceptual assessment of  the social facts’ reality. in the 
cybernetician paradigm’s epistemology, such facts, activities or events are just not what 
they look like; their very nature is deduced from meta-theoretical postulates about the 
truthfulness of  a series of  rather normative propositions. their informational nature 
is nothing more than the result of  a deduction or of  a deductive (-recursive) loop that 
starts with an affirmation about the existence of  informational events in society and 
ends with the comparison of  some social facts (events, etc.) and the behaviour of  “infor-
mation” in a communication system à la channon.3
this is possible only because social scientists working within the cybernetician para-
digm share the belief  that information is “out there”. even though it is not directly 
observable, as we have already seen, still, analyses can depict it with, so they say, a grand 
precision. the belief  in the informational nature of  social facts is nothing more than 
an ontological belief; a belief, that is, about what is supposed to be the reality of  some 
facts otherwise destined to be unexplained by science. (we can see that in doing so, 
social science, as luhmann (995) suggested, is typically understood as being a social 
vector contributing to the reduction of  society’s “entropy”, helping, in other words, to 
3. it is not rare, in effect, to read a description of  whatever social or economic behaviour as corresponding 
to the different phases implied in the black box metaphoric model, which of  course c.e. channon used to 
illustrate some of  his theses on codification in communication.
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maintain it as a system whose conserved “energy” supports society’s own reproduction 
from within—a conservative theory if  any.)
Probabilistic sociality
what is a social fact or action (or activity) or event? if  one answers that it is some-
thing like an information process and that it can therefore be measured like any other 
kind of  information, then one is certainly not realizing that what one says is that an 
analogy can be quantified and analysed as a quantity of  information with regards to the 
information theory. this is one of  the tasks u. eco, for instance, tried to achieve long 
ago.4 But what this means, in particular, is that there is a possibility that the true reality 
of  social facts etc, is made of  linguistic or semiotic materials. if  we can “read” them 
properly, then the probability of  discovering truth from our readings augments: society 
is hence nothing more than a text in waiting to be interpreted, once our observations 
are translated into an adequate representative language—may it be observational or 
analytical. as appealing as this theory can certainly be, it is quite difficult to admit 
that a rhetorical figure such as analogy could serve as the basis for a methodologically 
well defined research approach, in the sense that working inside such a conceptual 
frame cannot do otherwise than to mislead the researcher by having him or her look 
for something that necessitate to be extracted from the figure of  analogy as a model 
for something that it is not representing anything in itself. in short, analogies cannot be 
found somewhere else than in texts and cannot be about anything else that linguistic 
content.5 how about models? do they work differently? isn’t true that a mathematical 
model is nothing else than an analogy when it is representing something that is observ-
able in the real world?
the role played by models of  any kind, in sciences is, i think, of  idealization. what 
they represent is what scientists make them represent, by necessity or by convention. 
in this sense, models are always approximations, even though some of  them prove to 
be extraordinarily efficient. they are so because reality cannot be entirely doubled by 
scientific activities, from the experimental point of  view as well as from the modelling 
one.6
now, the most important reason why social facts, etc, cannot be informational in 
4. eco, umberto, La struttura assente, milano: casa ed. valentino Bompiani & c.s.p.a., 968; La structure 
absente, Paris: mercure de france, 972. for him, « Information represents the freedom of  choice we have in composing 
a message, it is thus a statistical propriety of  the messages’ source.” (italics original; my translation from eco (972), 
p. 46.)
5. i am not referring to Peirce’s semiotics—which i will not try to resume here. let it just be said that 
Peirce, in brief, defined a typology which includes one type of  sign that is precisely acting as a symbol 
whilst not being linguistic neither in its constituents, nor in its ways of  signifying; it has a cognitive dimen-
sion. PeiRce, charles sanders (93), Collected Papers, (edited by charles hartshorne and Paul weiss) 
cambridge: harvard university Press.
6. hacKinG, ian (983), op. cit. see also: BunGe, mario (973), Method, Model and Matter, dordrecht: 
d. Reidel.
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nature is “simply” because, from a realistic point of  view, their very mode of  realiza-
tion is not probabilistic—a probability that would realize itself  is furthermore nonsense. 
compared, let’s say, to the urn model—containing an x number of  balls of  two or more 
different colours in any proportion you like—a social model of  some sort does not and 
cannot have the same characteristics than of  the urn itself. Picking up balls in total 
blindness from the urn produces an outcome. this outcome or random event is what 
concerns probabilistic analysis, not the action of  picking up randomly balls from the 
urn. (when the total number of  balls is know, the probability P of  sorting a number 
x of  balls of  colour a is equal to the probability P2 of  sorting a number y of  balls of  
colour b added to P… Pn divided by P2…Pn; if  all actions consisting of  picking up a 
ball are mutually exclusive. this formula doesn’t take in account the actions of  picking.) 
whereas social facts, actions or events do not always present themselves as outcomes of  
preceding facts, actions nor events (they are often “mutually exclusive”, in a sense); the 
causal bond, if  any, is just impossible to appraise, but more importantly their “selection” 
as what they are said to be is merely arbitrary. what this is intended to mean is this: a social 
fact, action or event cannot be defined, as concept, as the outcome of  a random selec-
tion of  a fact, action or event from a categorically well constructed ensemble of  facts, 
actions or events. such ensembles are something that can only be significant inside a 
social theory: they are pure analytical devices whose purposes are to illustrate a thesis 
of  some kind about society’s organization or structure, or about whatever progress it is 
said to be the case that it has if  any, etc.7 this is why selection is arbitrary meaning, but 
not exclusively, that it is a theory-guided process interested in fulfilling social theory’s 
goals of  scientific achievements.
sometimes it is likely possible for someone to evaluate some kind of  social behav-
iour, from directly observing the fact, action or event being realized before one’s eye: a 
riot, a protest, lovers having dinner at a restaurant, a homeless person strolling about 
with no apparent reason, etc. what one can observe, then, is in fact the bond that 
ties the observable fact, action or event and the intentionality of  the actors, which we 
can both infer inductively from our comparing what is being observed and our actual 
social common knowledge. in other words, we act as if  we were in the anthropologist’s 
boots observing how some tribe’s members interact,8 that is, we observe people doing 
something in context because we know how to represent to ourselves what contexts are. 
and that context is what is evaluated and what allows finding signification in what is 
observed; but signification is not directly observable. if  it were, we could then accept the 
idea that, in a certain way, there is perhaps a communicative process going on; it would 
then be easy and fortunate to assimilate a concept of  signification to an informational 
7. see RoBillaRd, Jean (999), “ l’enquête et l’analyse dans les sciences sociales: trois problèmes ”, 
Cahiers d’épistémologie, Groupe de Recherche en épistémologie comparée, département de philosophie, 
université du Québec à montréal, nº 9905.
8. i am not proposing that interactionism is the only valuable method of  social science, which on the 
contrary seems to be the case with Jeff  coulter in his “chance, cause and conduct: probability theory and 
the explanation of  human action”, in shanKeR, op. cit., p 266-29.
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content one, even though the problem of  choice of  composing whatever helps transmit 
the signification should be excluded of  this theory, and even though the semantic analy-
sis here implied does not make great sense in the context of  information theory.9
3. concludinG RemaRKs: outline of an alteRnative 
PhilosoPhical theoRy of communication
in the social sciences, “communication” is a term and concept generally used to des-
ignate a special category of  human behaviour. communication theory is about explain-
ing how this behaviour comes about amongst social groups. to do this, communication 
theory has to associate at least three concepts: communication, social group, social fact 
(or activity, or action, or event); and it has to postulate, likewise wiener, that communi-
cation, as a fact, is the cement of  society.20 so, explaining this special type of  behaviour 
reduces to explaining how society can hold its parts together. communication, as a 
concept, is then self-referential: it means what it means only because it logically implies 
that it is a proper representation of  a special order of  social factuality. the obviousness 
of  the informational character of  the behaviours subsumed under the unifying category 
of  “social behaviour” is hence not even questionable. why should it be? the model 
apparatus and, mostly, the “style of  reasoning” involved in their usage, have proven to 
be reliable. But were they?
my critiques show, at the very least, that this reliability is highly problematic. to 
begin with, what i would call the procedural ontologization of  the concept of  informa-
tion—giving information an existing status, i.e. in a non-phenomenogical manner, in 
the social field—cannot be interpreted as a scientific approach to communication. i do 
not want to give the impression that i think that the only features of  reality deserving to 
be considered of  some scientific interest are directly observable ones. to the contrary, 
i do not find problematic at all that, for instance, physics study unobservable particles 
of  matter.2 what i find has rather important shortcomings is the thesis that sociality 
9. there a further problems that should get one’s attention, in particular the problem of  determinism: is 
society deterministic or not? then again, this problem is not proper of  society as such, but it is of  the type 
of  analysis we do of: i) the empirical characteristics of  the fact, activity or event that are retained as typi-
cally social for the sake of  social analysis; and ii) the epistemic structure of  concepts and other theoretical 
constructs used in social analysis. determinism makes sense if  and only if  we can observe regularities of  
some sorts, and if  these regularities can be explained as having the same observables features and as being 
caused by the same cause or causes. that means that determinism cannot find a probabilistic justifica-
tion, if  we let aside the thesis that a probabilistic causality is not contradictory in itself  as a concept, and 
that it presents epistemic features that makes it quasi-causal. see: GaRfinKel, alan (98), Forms of  
Explanation, london: yale university Press; GRanGeR, Gilles-Gaston (992), La vérification, Paris: Éditions 
odile Jacob, coll. Philosophie; fRancK, Robert (dir.; 994), Faut-il chercher aux causes une raison? L’explication 
causale dans les sciences humaines, Paris: librairie Philosophique J. vrin.
20. “i do not mean that the sociologist is unaware of  the existence and the complex nature of  communica-
tions in society, but until recently he has tended to overlook the extent to which they are the cement which 
binds its fabrics together.” wieneR, norbert (967), The Human Use of  Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society, 
new york: avon Books, [950 by houghton mifflin and company],  p. 39. 
2. though this thesis can be submitted to historico-philosophical analysis as well. Galison, Peter (997), 
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is about a communication process involving selection of  information conceived as an 
immaterial constituent of  sociality. the major problem with this thesis is that it doesn’t 
seem possible to define this concept of  information in a legitimate way—that is, in such 
a way that what it is supposed to refer to could be significant of  social facts, actions or 
events that are not describable in informational terms. would a linguistic (whether con-
textualist or pragmaticist,22 or conventionalist) description do the job? this is far from 
sure. Because it is hardly the case that these facts, etc, could be resumed as linguistic: 
language cannot be said to cover the entire scope of  sociality. a linguistic approach 
of  sociality would necessarily not clearly distinguish between the level of  the fact, or 
the action, or the event as it can be described, and the level of  its linguistic description 
proper.23
so, what is sociality? this concept cannot be defined without being compared to 
the concept of  “social”. for example, for durkheim, sociality is what characterizes the 
individual consciousness of  the moral norm imposed to individuals by society and in 
spite of  the individual’s will and his or her conscience of  the norm. the social level is 
from that point of  view a supra-individual order. this dichotomy is easy to identify in 
the vast majority of  sociology’s textbooks—in whatever language, i might add. the 
concept of  social is therefore referring to this second order of  society’s constitutive 
structure in opposition to the first order exemplified by the concept of  sociality. this 
first order is usually referred to as the one where facts, action or event occur and are 
observable—whether directly or not is not important at this point. and i think that this 
is true in almost all sociological traditions.24 sociality has to do with the ways by which 
people interact in the sense of  bonding by whatever means available. communication 
is only one of  them.
hence, a general theory of  communication cannot pretend to offer a full-length 
portrait of  what “society” is like, because this is just not where communication amongst 
socialized people can be detected as a matter of  fact.25 a general theory of  communica-
Image and Logic. A Material Culture of  Microphysics, chicago and london: university of  chicago Press.
22. as in GilBeRt, margaret (992), On Social Facts, Princeton: Princeton university Press.
23. which habermas doesn’t see in his theory of  communicative action. haBeRmas, Jürgen (987), 
Théorie de l’agir communicationnel: Rationalité de l’agir et rationalisation de la société, t. , Paris: fayard; Théorie de l’agir 
communicationnel: Pour une critique de la raison fonctionnaliste, t. 2, Paris: fayard; honneth, axel, Joas, hans 
(eds.) (99) Communicative action: Essays on Jürgen Habermas’s The Theory of  Communicative Action, cambridge: 
m.i.t. Press; PhaRo, Patrick (993), Le sens de l’action et la compréhension d’autrui, Paris: l’harmattan, coll. 
logiques sociales.
24. it would be tempting to attribute this theoretical trait of  sociology’s intrinsic philosophy to auguste 
comte, who coined the very word and concept of  “sociology”.  comte divided sociology in two parts, 
“physique sociale” which studied directly observable actions of  agents in relation to what then was per-
ceived as physiological laws of  human behaviour; and “statique sociale” that studied social institutions 
and orders of  different kinds, as they were in comte’s terms the resulting effects of  directly observable 
human actions but independent of  individuals’ conscience and will; their mode of  existence were therefore 
supra-individualistic.
25. this is implied by a theory of  society where it is clear that the concept of  “society” is an epistemologi-
cal construct that has no ontological range whatsoever. consequently, “society” cannot refer to anything 
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tion cannot therefore serve as a justification matrix for a general theory of  society that is 
called in its turn to serve as an interpretative matrix applied to second order analysis of  
society. this does not mean that a general theory of  society cannot integrate concepts 
like “communication” in its theoretical structure. But it would have to apply a general 
prudence maxim to its usage.26
this leaves us with a last question: what general communication theory? to begin 
with, such a theory should be based on the empirical observation that when people 
communicate, and they effectively do so by means of  language and/or other symbolic 
devices such as texts, images, etc, what they convey to others is not information, but 
meanings. understanding sociality is therefore beginning to understand what role linguis-
tic communication plays in binding individuals together.27 amongst the possible ways to 
represent these, propositions and propositional calculus rules, for instance, are certainly 
the most applied means, because it is generally admitted, in a more or less fregean style, 
that meaning is the outcome or the equivalent of  an intentional state. let it be so. for 
the only reliable and material way to access to intentional meaning is to have people 
express them; and usually, this is done via language. now this linguistic communica-
tion takes place in a context and this conditions a great part of  both the ways linguistic 
and non-linguistic expressions are formulated and/or carried out. therefore, linguistic 
communication takes place in determined contexts and is about sharing meanings; in 
turn, context determines that meanings are in a way self-contained in the sense that 
they cannot be communicated otherwise than in linguistic forms and they refer to what 
bonds individuals in the context of  the very linguistic communication. do its descrip-
tions in whatever formalized language give the whole portrait of  sociality? of  course it 
doesn’t. this model is a local one; it gives a fair representation of  what is going on in a 
portion of  reality but says nothing on how sociality is outside language.
this model cannot be generalized to society, because the level to which this last 
concept refers to is always and most surely describable in analytical terms, not empirical 
ones. what we need, then, is a model of  social communication that integrates a model 
of  sociality as partly describable in communicational and linguistic terms. what we 
need is a theory of  social meaning, not a semantic, but a theory that would show how 
it is possible for meanings to be socially efficient—in a pragmatic way. such a theory 
that can be described in empirical terms. it is a pure analytical device whose usefulness is to supply factual 
descriptions expressed in an observational language, with a semantic adapted to the task of  understanding 
some general type propositions (or empirical generalizations) about facts, actions or events. now, one can 
surely question this usefulness; which i will not do here.
26. this can be deduced or formulated after last note’s statements.
27. Gilbert’s (992) contribution is from that point of  view exemplary (op. cit.); so is sperber & wilson’s 
(989): sPeRBeR, dan, wilson, deirdre, La pertinence: communication et cognition, Paris: Éditions de minuit, 
(fr. translation of  Relevance. Communication and Cognition london: Blackwell, 986. searle’s The Construction of  
Social Reality cannot count as a contribution only if  one counts that the application of  speech act theory to 
social theory (why not?) is relevant in any possible way (seaRles, John R. (995), The Construction of  Social 
Reality, new york: the free Press). now, in response to the epistemological claims, purposes and goals of  
any social constructivism see: hacKinG, ian (999), The Social Construction of  What?, cambridge: harvard 
university Press.
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could handle systemic concepts and means, but would not need to base its epistemo-
logical thesis on any information theory whatsoever. meaning and information are not 
comparable, from a pure informational point of  view. it would leave systemic concepts 
work as they should be working, within the analyticity and abstraction level they belong 
to. social communication can therefore be labelled a systemic type of  communication, 
meaning by this that it concerns abstract properties and variables describing a world of  
meaning that only exists because of  its usefulness to procure safe theoretical explana-
tions about what could not otherwise be apprehended. it gives a conceptual scheme for 
understanding some class of  social facts, actions or events whose elements escape direct 
observation. it is not a set of  rule for interpreting the information distribution in society; 
for this is a conceptual flaw.
Jean Robillard, Ph.d. 
télé-université, université du Québec
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